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Mackenzie Fire Shelter Deployment – June 1, 1994

This Day in History is a brief summary of a powerful learning opportunity and is not intended to second guess or be judgmental of decisions and actions. Put yourself in the following situation as if you do not know the outcome. What are the conditions? What are you thinking? What are YOU doing?

 

To learn more about this incident read See You on the Other Side.

Incident Summary

On May 31, 1994, the Mackenzie Fire was reported 40 miles south of Kingman, AZ in the Hualapai Mountains. The next day, three members of the Prescott Interagency Hotshot Crew deployed their shelters in a boulder field and survived a high intensity burnover with minor injuries. Two of them, Prescott’s Foreman, and Squad Boss, were very close friends who had full and unlimited trust in the other’s leadership and judgment. This account includes the reflections of Curtis Heaton, who deployed that day, and asks readers to examine the role of trust in their organization.

Standard Tactics

Prescott Hotshots arrived on scene and after an aerial recon decided to work the head of the fire toward Pleasant Valley Hotshots who were to anchor from the fire’s heel. The fire was 100 acres of grass/chaparral in steep terrain, held in check by a retardant line. Prescott’s foreman and one Helitack crew member flew into an agreed upon landing zone (LZ) in the black. The pilot declined landing in the black and selected a new LZ (H2) in the green ahead of the fire’s right flank. From there, crew personnel planned to hike to the fire’s edge and construct direct line. Prescott’s foreman and the Helitack crew member unloaded at H2 while two Prescott crewmembers shuttled in on the next flight to join their foreman and begin the assignment.

Keeping Silent

As Prescott Squad Boss Curtis flew into the fire, he noticed turbulence in flight and a significant increase in fire behavior from just minutes prior. Something didn’t feel right. It was June in Arizona and 2 p.m. “Why the hell are we landing here?”, Curtis recalls thinking as the helicopter descended into the green at H2. Looking out the helicopter window he tried to read his foreman’s face. He paused. He could key his mic and turn down the assignment. But Curtis knew his foreman well, trusted his fire expertise, and trusted his judgment immensely. So, despite not liking the situation, Curtis stepped out of the ship, answering his own question: “If it needed to be shut down, he would have done it.” From H2 the three hotshots made note of a wind change in direction and started moving together away from the head of the fire. Yet within a few minutes, the fire had flanked into alignment with the canyon previously identified as their escape route. The flank quickly became a head fire cutting off all egress, and the three hotshots deployed in the boulder field moments before the flame front arrived.

Discussion Questions:

  1. Curtis explains that trust contributed to the acceptance of tremendous risk that day, yet it is the same trust that saved their lives. Define trust in your organization. How does the kind of trust you aim to develop look and perform?
  2. Days after the deployment, Curtis asked his foreman why he chose that location for a LZ. His response: “Why didn’t you say something?” Working in a high-risk environment requires high-risk discussions across ranks, why do we often view questioning someone or having genuine curiosity as a lack of trust? 
    If you have a mutual trust relationship, wouldn't questions and curiosity be welcomed by both parties?
  3. Training opportunity: Build a tactical decision game where two or more parties have limited information and must question each other to fully understand the situation. Establish a trigger word such as "Unclear" or "Uncertain" that alerts both parties the conversation must go further to reach understanding. This informs everyone that it is not about trusting the sender but about acknowledging the complexity of what is occurring.
  4. What systems (like trigger words) can you employ to encourage raising questions at key decision making points? How do you practice questioning each other so that it becomes a part of your crew’s culture?

References:

Mackenzie Fire, Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center
See You On The Other Side, Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center
Curtis Heaton, personal communication, January 15, 2024
Recommended Reading: Schein, E. H., Schein, P. A. (2021). Humble Inquiry: The Gentle Art of Asking Instead of Telling (2nd ed.).
 


 

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